It's 10 p.m. Do you know

The Kyl bill (S. 692 in its current form) would criminalize Internet gambling, thereby creating a new federal enforcement concern and, effectively, a new federal jurisdiction: gambling in cyberspace.

Senator Kyl, who refers to interactive wagering as the "hard-core cocaine of gambling" and says the Internet makes it easy for teenagers to wager away their family's life savings, initially proposed a blanket prohibition of all forms of gambling through any interactive medium, in- On-Track including computer networks broadly defined. Blanket prohibition is what Account Betting the Kyl bill's anti-gambling constituency wants. It is what the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC) recommended in its Final Report.

Blanket prohibition has the defect (from racing's point of view) of making simulcasting (which is conducted through computer networks) and account wagering (which utilizes both telephone lines and computer networks including the networks that support simulcasting) federal crimes. Effectively, Kyl's bill as originally drafted (and the National Gambling Impact Study Commission recommendation if implemented by by Congress) would shut the racing industry down. While that might be fine with the Kyl bill's anti-gambling supporters, it complicates the legislative process by forcing Senators and Representatives from racing states to oppose it. This fact of Congressional life caused Senator Kyl to amend his bill to provide exemptions for parimutuel wagers (as well as for fantasy sports leagues and contests and state lotteries).

At the time of writing (August 1999) the House version of the Kyl bill , which might differ materially from the version reported from Senate Judiciary, had yet to appear.

But if the fate of Kyl's bill remains unclear, the Senator's anti-Internet gambling crusade has produced at least one concrete result: it has elevated the racing industry's simulcasting and account wagering practices above the horizon of legal visibility. This is not good news.

For more than two decades racing has quietly been conducting in-home account wagering under the authority of state law and inter-facility, interstate simulcast wagering under the authority of the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978. Or so the industry assumed.

Racing has become dependent on simulcasting. Only 22 percent of U.S. handle on horse races was wagered on live races in 1998. The balance-78 percent-was bet off-track or on inter-facility simulcasts (Exhibit 2). Full-card simulcasting accounted for approximately $6.3 billion, or 40 percent of the U.S. total. Take that away and owners can ship their horses back to the farm.

And that bright interactive future? About $500 million was wagered through telephone accounts in 1998. Approximately $2 million was handled by Internet services such as You Bet.Com. If Congress allows the interactive ventures in Exhibit 1 to develop, these numbers are likely to be considerably larger in the future.

Interactive television. What interactive television can do for racing is indicated by Exhibits 3 and 4. Exhibit 3 presents New York Racing Association (NYRA) telephone account wagering from 1992 through 1998. In 1992 NYRA had 1,552 telephone accounts that handled wagers totaling $9.3 million. In 1993 New York authorized television coverage of NYRA racing. We're not talking about an interactive television service comparable to TVG: nothing like TV Guide's marketing muscle or Fox Sports's production values, just the track monitor feed on a non-interactive cable channel far down the dial. But the number of NYRA telephone accounts doubled in 1993 and increased fivefold by 1998. NYRA's account handle doubled. And that's just the tip of a much larger iceberg. NYRA’s account wagering operation labors under statutory minimum account balance requirements high enough to place them out of reach of all but serious horseplayers. OTB doesn't have this requirement. OTB account wagering dwarfs NYRA's, reaching $303 million in 1998 (Exhibit 4)-all because of a single, noninteractive racing television channel.

The Internet. Digital cable is a broadband pipe serving a passive viewership. The Internet is (for most households today, which do not have cable modems, T1 lines, or DSL connections) a narrowband pipe serving people who want to interact. Down that road ahead these two media may converge: couch potatoes may develop interactive viewing habits, and in a broadband environment the Internet may become a programming mediurn in the sense television is today.

But right now Internet wagering services are primarily for gamblers, not the general public TVG is aiming at. How good the fit is for horseplayers is indicated in Exhibits 5 and 6. These exhibits present month-by-month results for You Bet.com, from June 1998 through April 1999. Take a good look at these exhibits. The number of accounts (Exhibit 5) grew explosively, from 750 (in June 1998) to 3,800 (in April 1999). Handle grew even more explosively: from $92,000 (in June 1998) to $3.5 million (in April 1999). You Bet.com is a startup and these numbers are small-but the growth curves look like Amazon.com's. It is impossible to look at them and not conclude that the Internet has tremendous potential for horse racing.

This potential, and interstate wagering on horse racing in general including simulcasting, is now on federal radar screens. In 1998 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), a sponsor of the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act, asked the Department of Justice (DOJ) about the Kyl bill. The Department replied in a letter signed by L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General . Mr. Sutin was unenthusiastic about the Kyl bill. DOJ believes, Mr. Sutin wrote,

Or, presumably, lawful parimutuel wagering on horse races.

Senator Leahy repeated his question a year later, eliciting a second response from Justice, this time signed by Jon P. Jennings! The Internet, Mr. Jennings, wrote,

That is, the federal government has jurisdiction over gambling in cyberspace under existing law but just to make sure Congress should make it perfectly clear that the federal government has jurisdiction over "new forms of gambling" enabled by new technologies.

Mr. Jennings goes on to re-affirm the three "overarching principles" adduced by Mr. Sutin: equal treatment of activities in the physical world and in cyberspace; technologyneutral; and careful draftsmanship to accomplish objectives without stifling the growth of the Internet or chilling its use as a communications medium. This may best be done, Mr. Jennings advises, by dispensing with S. 692 and, instead, amending §1084 in three respects:

"(1) to clarify that section 1084 applies to all betting or wagering (not merely betting or wagering on sports events) and includes the sending and receiving of bets and wagers over wireless communications facilities;

(2) to require interactive computer service providers to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in the same manner as is currently required of common carriers and to grant such providers the same shield from liability that is currently provided to common carriers; and

(3) to explain that section 1084 applies to those engaged in the business of betting or wagering who are located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, when those individuals knowingly facilitate or aid in unlawful betting and wagering by sending or receiving a bet or wager, or information assisting in the placing of a bet or wager, from an individual located within the United States."

In other words, Mr. Jennings recommends amending the Wire Act to cover all bets or wagers, not just those on "sporting events"; making it "explicit that it is not only illegal for gambling businesses to send or receive wagers, but it is also illegal for them to send or receive information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers? [italics added], while cautioning that this suggestion may need to be reviewed "to ensure that the statute is constitutional;" extending it to wireless communications; and making §1084 (as amended) apply to businesses or persons located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States who facilitate unlawful wagering by sending or receiving a wager or information assisting in the placing of a bet or wager from an individual located within the United States.

If Congress should ignore DOJ's advice and enact S. 692, Mr. Jennings wants the exemption for parimutuel wagering deleted (he says nothing about the lottery exemption):

"[T]he Department of justice opposes the exemptions for pari-mutuel wagering and fantasy sports leagues, because there is no legitimate reason why bets or wagers sent or received by gambling businesses on these activities should be exempted from the ban while bets and wagers on other activities are not. The Department of justice is especially troubled by the broad exemptions given to parimutuel wagering, which essentially would make legal on the Internet types of pari-mutuel wagering that are not legal in the physical world. The Department of Justice notes that S. 692 may incorrectly imply that the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §3001 et seq., allows for the legal transmissions and receipt of interstate pari-mutuel bets or wagers. The Interstate Horseracing Act does not allow for such gambling, and if a pari-mutuel wagering business currently transmits or receives interstate bets or wagers (as opposed to intrastate bets and wagers on the outcome of a race occurring in another state), it is violating federal gambling laws."

In other words, Kyl's bill has made interstate wagering an issue with the Department of Justice. The federal authority for interstate simulcast wagering many in racing assumed the Interstate Horseracing Act provides is, according to Justice, illusory; as troubling, Justice objects to exempting pari-mutuel wagering from a federal prohibition of interactive wagering-by whatever technological medium.

The letters of Messrs. Sutin and Jennings are lengthy, carefully drafted documents that treat of a number of complicated issues-issues that affect activities beyond pari-mutuel racing, or even gambling generally. But as these letters concern racing they turn on two distinct but closely related questions: Where do wagers through telecommunications media occur? And who has jurisdiction?

Only yesterday the answer to this question was simple: at the $2 window, on the race track grounds. Unfortunately, as is now only too clear, off-track betting and simulcasting have altered this simple case. OTB and simulcasting decoupled wagers from the races they are made on. The decoupling is an industry goal: it makes possible the extension of racing's retail mechanism beyond the race track. But it has an unforeseen consequence. Wagering on horse races has been enveloped in locational uncertainty. In a spooky analogue to Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principal, interstate wagers take place in a kind of quantum mechanical twilight zone where their location depends on the observation of qualified observers, meaning lawyers. And as you might expect, lawyers observing interstate wagers have conflicting views.

"Jurisdiction," once a simple concept in racing, has become a convoluted, and increasingly disputed, matter. While the location of a horse race is (still?) precisely known, the location of wagers on it has become something for courts to determine. Are bets placed where the bettor is located? At the wagering hub where the bet is processed, which might or might not be the track where the race is run? Where an Internet server is located? All of the above? None? And what, exactly, is a wager?

Lawyers, judges, law enforcement agencies and legislators all over the world are trying to figure this out. Like an elementary particle, which has no precise location until physicists measure it, wagers are shrouded in clouds of geographic uncertainty that only legal observation dispels. Opinions are multiplying like rabbits; like rabbits, their departures from the ground of real world activity, though abrupt, lack consensus.

Racing's brief in this dispute has been drawn up by the National Thoroughbred Racing Association (NTRA), which recently reviewed the legal basis for interstate account wagering with the help of Rogers & Wells, 9 NTRA's carefully worded conclusion is that "state and federal statutes and case law discussed above leave little doubt that it is lawful for an account wagering facility located in a state that has specifically authorized account wagering to conduct account wagering with account holders who arc located in states other than that where their account is located."10 This means that, in NTRA's view, the wagering occurs ("is conducted") in the state where the account is located, pursuant to instructions from the account holder however transmitted, not in the state where the account holder is located. That is, what bettors and racing people refer to in common English as "interstate wagers" are made in the state where the wagers are received by account facility operators, not in the state where the "bettor" (is he or she a "bettor", or a "sender of wagering instructions"?), is located when the instructions are sent.

Readers who have not had the benefit of a legal education may be confused by this. Wagering through a telephone (or the Internet) isn't, as many account holders probably think, wagering in the sense that walking up to the $2 window and instructing the clerk to put $2 on the A horse is wagering. "Account wagering," in NTRA's definition, "is the practice by which a customer of a licensed racing association or off-track betting corporation establishes an account with such account wagering facility and causes wagers to be made from that account by sending instructions to the facility operator.

NTRA and Rogers & Wells adopt this circumlocution out of fear of the Wire Act. The Wire Act, NTRA and Rogers & Wells observe, is arguably "not applicable to interstate wagering because the Wire Act was not intended to be directed at a legitimate, regulated, and licensed pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing. Rather, the Wire Act is undeniably directed at 'illegal gambling'-bookmaking and the like conducted by organized crime. "

Having established this important and material point, NTRA and Rogers & Wells retreat from it and proceed to argue that "pari-mutuel account wagering in connection with interstate simulcasting of horse races is exempted from the statute's prohibitions by the information exemption in §1084(b)," which makes a distinction between wagers, whatever they may be, and "the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce... of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a state or foreign country where betting on the sporting event or contest is legal into a state or foreign country in which such betting is legal." (Italics added.) This implicitly concedes that the Wire Act might apply to "pari-mutuel account wagering in connection with interstate simulcasting of horse races" and seeks to exempt this activity on the grounds that information, and not wagers, are what cross state lines. Hence the circumlocution.

NTRA's review of wagering case law follows a trail back into the late 19th century that primarily concerns bets at fixed odds and rests on the law of contracts: logically enough, since bets between punters and bookmakers have long been regarded by courts as contracts entered into by these parties. NTRA and Rogers & Wells arc able to show that this case law clearly supports "the proposition that where wagering instructions are sent from one location to another, the bet occurs where the instructions are received and accepted."

This is fine as far as it goes. There is, however, a separate trail of case law arising from jurisdictional disputes over Internet gambling. The tendency of courts in these disputes is to decide that jurisdiction over Internet wagering resides in the state where the bettor is located, regardless of where the server receiving the wager, or instructions to make the wager, or money to settle the results of the wagering, is located.

A recent case in point is State of' New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corporation, Charles Edward Ramos presiding. NTRA and Rogers & Wells dismiss World Interactive Gaming Corporation with a footnote, but we've discussed Justice Ramos's decision with lawyers who are preparing law review articles about it, and take a different view. World Interactive Gaming Corporation is worth reviewing here, if only as a broadly representative example of this second, and rapidly growing, body of wagering case law.

World Interactive Gaming Corporation ("WIGC"), a Delaware corporation with corporate offices in Bohernia, N.Y., obtained, through a wholly owned Antiguan subsidiary, Golden Chips Casino ("GCC"), a license from the government of Antigua to operate a land-based casino in Antigua. GCC installed servers in Antigua to, in Justice Ramos's words, "allow users around the world to gamble from their home computers." GCC advertised this casino in print and electronic media viewed by New York residents. Although GCC refused bets from callers who gave a New York address, it accepted bets from callers who (falsely) gave a Nevada address even though they remained physically in New York. In defense, WIGC moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the state of New York lacked jurisdiction personally over WIGC and GCC, and lacked, as well, subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute alleged violations of the Federal Wire Act, the Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Act, and the Wagering and Paraphernalia Act. WIGC further contended that no state or federal law regulates Internet gambling; that the wagering transactions complained of occurred offshore; and that these wagering transactions were completed in the course of operating a duly licensed legitimate business authorized by the government of Antigua.

"The central issue" in this case, Justice Ramos said, "is whether the State of New York can enjoin a foreign corporation legally licensed to operate a casino offshore from offering gambling to Internet users in New York." That is, does New York have jurisdiction? And, if so, on what grounds? Justice Ramos decided New York does have jurisdiction. The reasoning of judges, unlike the reasoning of kings, is subject to review, by other judges, by scholars and students in law journals, by credentialed professors in law schools, by legislators, even by the public. Some examples prove more influential than others. Concerning the force of this example we have no opinion, but Justice Ramos's expansive view of state jurisdiction over gambling by state residents may strike responsive chords elsewhere on the bench and in the halls of legislatures. It is therefore worth examining in some detail.

State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corporation's value as a test of state jurisdiction over Internet gambling is perhaps obscured by the strong grounds for personal jurisdiction created by WIGC's other business activities: WIGC is "clearly doing business in New York for purposes of acquiring personal jurisdiction... [operating] its entire business from its corporate headquarters in Bohemia, New York. . . Moreover, even without physical presence in New York, WIGC's activities are sufficient to meet the minimum contact requirement of International Shoe Co. v. Washington respondents engaged in an advertising campaign all over the country to induce people to gamble. Knowing that these ads were reaching thousands of New Yorkers, respondents made no attempt to exclude identifiable New Yorkers from the propaganda... Respondents cannot dispute that they do business in New York and that the acts complained of are subject to this court's jurisdiction."

Justice Ramos went on, however, to consider the arguments that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., gambling via offshore Internet servers) and that Internet gambling falls outside the scope of New York State gambling prohibitions because the gambling occurs outside New York State: under New York penal law "if the person engaged in gambling is located in New York, then New York is the location where the gambling occurred [See Penal Law §225.00(2)]... It is irrelevant that Internet gambling is legal in Antigua. The act of entering the bet and transmitting the information from New York via the Internet is adequate to constitute gambling activity within the New York state." Further, "[a]s for respondents' claim that none of the federal statutes applies to operation of an Internet casino licensed by a foreign government, there is nothing in the record or the law to support their contentions. To the contrary, the Wire Act, Travel Act and Wagering Paraphernalia Act all apply despite the fact that the betting instructions are transmitted from outside the United States over the Internet. The scope of each of these statutes clearly extends to the transmission of betting information to a foreign country. . ."

1) We have the NTRA/Rogers & Wells answer, which is that interstate account wagers aren't actually wagers but instructions to make wagers that become wagers in the receiving state (where the account is operated). This answer implies jurisdiction in the receiving state.

2) We have the broad tendency of a newer body of case law arising from disputes about jurisdiction over Internet gambling, exemplified by the decision of justice Ramos in World Interactive Gaming Corporation, that, paraphrased for non-lawyers, says if the person entering the relevant information (a wager, or instructions to make a wager, or whatever else defendants may call it) is in my state when he enters whatever he enters into the computer I have jurisdiction-because defendant is in my state. It doesn't matter where the wager, or instructions or whatever you call them, are received (Antigua, Australia, Mars) and it doesn't matter whether the account operator in Antigua, Australia or Mars is licensed to conduct wagering or not. I have jurisdiction. If this act isn't legal in my state, it's a crime. The question that so concerns NTRA and Rogers & Wells-Where does the bet occur? -isn't material to Justice Ramos, who finds the fact that the bettor or person entering instructions to make a bet into a terminal is in his state is sufficient to establish jurisdiction.

3) And we have the Department of Justice view, which is that none of this matters much because under the Wire Act the federal government has jurisdiction and, under the Wire Act, interstate wagering is illegal-and if some forms of gambling might not be illegal according to some judge's construction of the Wire Act in some court somewhere Congress should amend the Wire Act to make it perfectly clear that interstate gambling is illegal and is under federal jurisdiction. And by the way, the Interstate Horseracing Act does not authorize interstate wagering by state-licensed pari-mutuel businesses and if they engage in such activities, whatever those activities actually are, by wire, or Internet, or smoke signals they are committing a federal crime.

Racing's present existence, which depends on simulcasting, and its future prospects, which depend on interstate interactive wagering by means of interactive telecommunications technologies including interactive digital television and the Internet, are at stake here. The Kyl bill, which would criminalize Internet gambling, has provoked the Department of Justice into making racing's present interstate and prospective future interstate wagering operations an issue. justice relies on the Wire Act, a part of the criminal code intended to provide federal grounds for prosecuting organized crime, for this view of the legal basis for interstate pari-mutuel wagering, even when it is conducted not by organized crime but by statelicensed racing and legal off-track betting businesses-notwithstanding that "[i]t is the policy of the Congress in [the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978] to. . . further" these businesses.

Conceding that state-licensed parimutuel businesses should be lumped together with non-state-licensed illegal bookmakers and operators of non-state-licensed illegal wire rooms (or non-state or non-sovereign government-licensed Internet gambling service providers) is a dangerous concession for racing to make. NTRA and Rogers & Wells argue, as lawyers have been arguing since the 19th century, that legitimate interstate wagering is legal not because it is legitimate business authorized by the states that have primary jurisdiction over gambling but because it is in some convoluted way nor wagering at all but "instructions" to wager and therefore exempt from Wire Act sanctions.

This argument had, prior to the Kyl bill, largely escaped federal scrutiny. Now it is being scrutinized by DOJ. It is likely to be scrutinized by judges-and not just in the context of cases having to do with telephone account wagering but in cases involving Internet gambling service providers offshore. Some judge somewhere might ask him or herself this question: if the instruction "put $2 on the A horse to win," and the transmission of money to an account maintained in the jurisdiction where that instruction is executed to cover this $2 investment do not, collectively, constitute a wager, what exactly more is needed for a wager to have occurred? A paper ticket in the bettor's hand?

The Wire Act is not safe ground for racing. Neither are federal gambling prohibitions that exempt racing, because some attorney in the Justice Department may question them and the questions may prompt some court somewhere to strike them down.

State-licensed pari-mutuel businesses, like Australian-licensed Internet gambling service providers, do not belong,, in the same box with organized crime. Gambling licenses do confer legitimacy. That is what licensing is all about. By conceding jurisdiction over interstate wagering to the federal government under the Wire Act and then arguing for a parochial exemption, racing is saying, in effect, "I am not a crook."

This is not what racing should be saying, not about an issue as important to this industry's present operations and future prospects as interstate simulcasting and interstate interactive wagering are. What racing should be saying is that, as parimutuel businesses duly licensed by the states with primary jurisdiction over gambling, which conduct interstate wagering under the authority of the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, we do not fall under the Wire Act-and, pace Mr. Jennings, if there is any question about this let's get Congress to make it perfectly clear that interstate wagering, or Internet gambling by state-licensed parimutuel businesses, is legal and something Congress wants to further.

That is the safe ground. That is the sound foundation on which racing's interactive future can be built.

1 "'Elements of Contract", The Common Law, University Press: John Wilson and Son, Cambridge. pp. 304-305. Citations from case law omitted.

2 Sponsored by Senator John L. Kyl, R-Arizona, S. 692, the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, would amend Chapter 50 of title 18 U.S.C. by adding a new section, §1085 (after 18 U.S.C. § 1084 ("the Wire Act")). Introduced in the Senate March 23, 1999, 106th Congress, Ist Session. The Kyl bill has accumulated an interesting legislative history, possibly relevant should it become law and be tested in the courts. Introduced March 19, 1997, as S. 474, the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997 and the companion H.R. 2380, would have amended 18 U.S.C. §§1081 and 1084 (the Wire Act of 1964) to generally prohibit gambling through "all communication facilities," which presumably would include telecommunications media of every kind. In 1997 the Kyl bill was reported out of the Senate judiciary Committee (on October 23) but was unable to overcome opposition from Internet service providers (ISPs) and the racing industry and failed to reach the Senate floor before Congress recessed for the year. Juliana Gruenwald, "Ban on Cyberspace Gambling Gets First Push in Senate", Congressional Quarterly, October 25, 1997 (Weekly Report) p. 2597; Congressional Quarterly, December 6, 1997, p. 3010. The 1998 version of this legislation was attached to a Senate appropriations bill and approved 90 to 10, but Congressional attention was then absorbed by Monica and Bill and a companion House measure died. Senator Kyl reintroduced his bill in 1999 as S. 692, deleting a provision that would have subjected bettors to criminal penalties in deference to objections from the justice Department, providing protection for Internet service providers (ISPs) and telephone companies, and exempting state lotteries, pari-mutuel horse and greyhound racing and sports fantasy leagues from the bill's sanctions. On June 17, 1999 the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Kyl bill 16 to 1, Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin) casting the single dissenting vote.

3 Quoted in Jeri Clausing, "Senate Committee Approves Net Gambling Ban", The New York Times on the Web, June 17, 1999.

4 The NGISC report recommended prohibiting Internet gambling "without allowing new exemptions or the expansion of existing federal exemptions to other jurisdictions." National Gambling Impact Study Commission in a letter dated June 15, 1999 to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont); the NGISC also recommended that in prohibiting Internet gambling "Congress not pass any laws restricting how Indian tribes use existing telephone technology to link bingo games between reservations." Jeri Clausing op. cit.

5 S. 692 §2 (f) applicability.

6 15 U.S.C. §3001 et seq.

7 U.S. L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, to The Honorable Patrick Leahy, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., May 26, 1998.

8 'Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, to The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., June 9, 1999.

9 Gregory C. Avioli, senior vice-president business affairs, National Thoroughbred Racing Association, "Whether account wagering may be lawfully conducted by a state-licensed pari-mutuel facility with account holders located in a state other than the state where the account is located," August 3, 1999. 26 pages.

10 loc cit., p. 26.

11 loc cit., p. 2.

12 loc. cit., p. 12.

13 loc cit., p. 8.

14 The People of the State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corporation, Golden Chips Casino, Inc., Jeffrey Burton a.k.a. Jim Stevens, Cynthia Burton, Lawrence Blocker a.k.a. Steven Sanders et al., in the Supreme Court of the State of New York: Commercial Part 53, Index No. 404428/98, justice Charles Edward Ramos presiding. Decided July 22, 1999.

15 Avioli, p. IS.

16 WIGC also made telephone calls from its New York office soliciting sales of (unregistered in New York) WIGC stock, selling $1.8 million worth of these securities to 114 investors, including $125,000 worth to New York residents.

17 This sounds like entrapment to one of the attorneys we've spoken with.

18 U.S.C. §1084(a).

19 18 U.S.C. §1952.

20 18 U.S.C. §1953.

21 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

22 State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corporation, pp. 8-9.

23 State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corporation, p. 11.

24 State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corporation, p. 12.

25 15 U.S.C. §3001 (b)

Eugene Martin Christiansen, It's 10 p.m. Do you know where your wager is?  Issues of jurisdiction cloud racing's future, Mid-Atlantic Thoroughbred, November 1999, at 58-65